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CASE NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS-PRIVATE CITIZENS ACTING UNDER COLOR
OF STATE LAW-A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION
UNDER 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
On the night of September 24, 1969, plaintiff, Claudine Hall returned
home and found that her portable television set was missing. It had been
taken out of her apartment by her landlady, defendant, Sylvia Garson.
Garson seized plaintiff's television set while acting under the authority of
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. article 5238a,' which gives the landlord a lien
on the personal goods of the tenants that are in the rented premises and
also allows enforcement of that lien by the landlord's peremptory seizure
of the property. The lien is authorized up to the amount of the past-due
rents and the property can be seized without any prior judicial procedure
to determine validity of the amount or the claim, itself. Hall chal-
lenged the constitutionality of article 5238a as individual plaintiff for her-
self and as a representative of the class of tenants 2 affected by said statute,
seeking injunctive relief against defendants. She brought her constitu-
tional challenge in the United States District Court for the Southen Dis-
trict of Texas, urging that the court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. §
1343(4) 3 and that a claim for which relief could be granted was stated
I. "Section 1. The operator of any . . . apartment . . . shall have a lien upon
all baggage and all other property found within the tenant's dwelling for all rents
due and unpaid by the tenant thereof; and said operator shall have the right to
take and retain possession of such baggage and other property until the amount of
such unpaid rent is paid. Such baggage and other property shall be exempt from
attachment or execution to the same extent as set out in Article 4594, Revised
Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended, regulating baggage liens for hotels,
boarding houses, rooming houses, inns, tourist courts and motels." See also, Stalcup
and Williams, Property, 24 Sw. L.J. 30 (1970), where it was stated: "The Texas
legislature extended the landlord's lien by enactment of a variation of the hotel
operator's baggage lien law. . . . The Act arms the landlord with the right to
enter and take possession of such property until the rent is paid and to sell the
property to satisfy the lien." Id. at 32.
2. See 28 U.S.C.A. rule 23(a).
3. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person: (1) To recover damages for
injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privi-
lege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any con-
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under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 4  After a hearing, the court dismissed the
action on the grounds that there was neither jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1343 nor a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for which relief could be
granted, since there were adequate state judicial remedies available. The
court of appeals reversed the district court, and ruled that there was federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(4) and that a claim for which
relief could be granted was stated under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Hall v.
Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
This decision is significant because it extends a federal cause of ac-
tion under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 to plaintiffs who are deprived of their civil
rights by private persons, that is, those not employed by federal, state, or
municipal governments. Furthermore, such private person need not have
acted in concert with a government employee in order to be subject to
liability. The purpose of this note is to analyze the scope of this decision
against the backdrop of prior decisions in the area of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
and its criminal counterparts, 18 U.S.C.A. § § 241 and 242. 5
spiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42; (2) To recover damages from any
person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in sec-
tion 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about to occur and power to
prevent; (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
4. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."
5. See Turkington, Introduction: Some Limitations on an Impact Analysis in
Equal Protection Cases, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 443 (1970), where it is stated that
"When the Supreme Court interprets a constitutional provision such as the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, in addition to resolving a conflict
in a particular case, the Court is also setting down a standard for criminal and
civil responsibility. This is so because of the interconnection between the fourteenth
amendment and federal penal statutes, and statutes creating federal civil remedies."
Id. at 448.
18 U.S.C.A. § 241 (1964) reads: "If two or more persons conspire to injure, op-
press, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or because of his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
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This note will begin by analyzing the jurisdictional considerations of
exhaustion of state remedies, abstention, and jurisdictional amount, all
within the framework of a § 1983 cause of action. An examination of the
development and widening scope of § 1983, leading to the Hall decision
that a landlord acting pursuant to a state statute is acting under color of
state law, will follow.
JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
The first jurisdictional question the court considered is whether ex-
haustion of state remedies must be required before the court can acquire
jurisdiction. The doctrine of exhaustion is a court imposed limitation on
the exercise of federal jurisdiction. It requires a party to exhaust all other
state remedies available to him before he can resort to the federal court.6
Exhaustion is generally required with regard to administrative remedies as
opposed to judicial remedies. The rationale behind this distinction be-
tween administrative and judicial exhaustion of remedies is that the party
seeking the relief will not necessarily need judicial relief until the adminis-
trative process is complete, i.e., he will then receive judicial relief as a con-
sequence of the normal review process. Upon exhausting state adminis-
trative remedies, the party can choose between state or federal courts.7
Another distinction is that a judicial remedy determines liability based on
past or present facts under currently existing laws. An administrative
remedy looks to the future and forms a new rule to change conditions then
existing.8
The district court in Hall held that it lacked jurisdiction because plain-
tiffs failed to exhaust whatever state remedies they had or to show the in-
adequacy of those remedies. They found support for their holding by the
recent lower court opinion of Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School
or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life."
18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (1964) reads: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Ter-
ritory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by
reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 n.7 (1970).
6. 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 64 (Wright ed. 1960).
7. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 49 (1963).
8. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
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District,9 authored by another judge of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas. That court held that where state judicial and ad-
ministrative remedies were available, they should be exhausted before
pursuing federal remedies, since no federal interest would be served in
avoiding appropriate state remedies. 10 That court based its premise on
the legislative history of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983,11 but an examination of
that history clearly shows that relief may be had in the federal courts
without exhausting the judical remedies of state courts.1 2  Hall, it will
9. 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1970) was taken largely from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act (an act to enforce the Provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 17 STAT. 13 (1871)).
It later became REV. STAT. § 1979 and then 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1964). For a
thorough study of the legislative history of § 1983 and of the exhaustion doctrine,
see generally Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on
State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331 (1967);
Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REV. 277 (1965); Comment, 49 CAL. L. REV. 145 (1961); Note, Exhaustion
of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1968);
Note, 38 U. OF DET. L.J. 655 (1961); Note, Constitutional Law: "Under Color
of" Law and the Civil Rights Act, 1961 DUKE L.J. 452 (1961); Note, Limiting the
Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1486
(1969); Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1953); Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy
for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.L. REV. 839 (1964); Comment, Civil
Action for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEx. L. REV. 1015
(1967); Note, Civil Rights and State Authority: Toward the Production of a Just
Equilibrium, 1966 WIsc. L. REV. 831 (1966).
12. The case history of judicial remedies indicates such remedies need not be
exhausted before seeking relief in the federal courts. See Bacon v. Rutland R.R.,
232 U.S. 134 (1914) (bill in equity to prevent a state public service commission
from requiring a railroad to locate a passenger station in a particular place). In
this case, Mr. Justice Holmes held that the state remedy available was judicial, and
thus "the railroad company was free to assert its rights in the district court of the
United States." Id. at 138. See also supra note 8, at 211, where Mr. Justice
Holmes stated: "A Federal circuit court should not entertain a suit by which
injunctive relief is sought against railway passenger rates as fixed by the Virginia
State Corporation Commission, in advance of the appeal to the highest state court
from the order fixing the rates which is given by the state Constitution as of right to
any aggrieved party." There appears to be no reason for the difference in the deci-
sion of these two cases.
In Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196 (1924)
(bill in equity by a utility against a director of public works to enjoin the fixing of
rates based on a valuation of the utility), Mr. Chief Justice Taft held that
"[t]he state statute forbidding a stay of proceedings until a final judicial decree was
rendered, of course, could not prevent a federal court of equity from affording such
temporary relief by injunction as the principles of equity procedure required." Id.
at 201. The case history of exhaustion of administrative remedies indicates such
remedies must be exhausted before seeking relief in the federal courts. See, e.g.,
WRIGHT, supra note 7, at § 49, which holds that a plaintiff must exhaust state ad-
ministrative remedies although not judicial ones before complaining to a federal
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be remembered, dealt with state judicial remedies. Further, Harkness v.
Sweeny Independent School District 300,13 which was decided by the
same court as Hall, has rejected much of the Schwartz opinion. 14
An exception to the general rule that state administrative remedies
must be exhausted is found in the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape,'5
where Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the United States Supreme Court,
said that federal relief could be granted where state remedies were inade-
quate or available only in theory, but not in practice. 10 This rule can be
applied to cases which involve administrative remedies, as well as to those
which involve judicial remedies. Thus, where it would be futile to pursue
state administrative remedies, federal relief might be sought.
Another exception to the general premise that administrative remedies
must be exhausted is found in the line of cases where the state-afforded
remedies are inadequate both in theory and practice. Thus, the Supreme
court.
See also Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929),
which held that a transit company having filed application for a new rate, was without
right, before expiration of the thirty day statutory period, to resort to a federal court
to enjoin an attempt to enforce existing rates, even though the commission had
already decided that it lacked jurisdiction to permit the new rate. The court in
Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1970) insists this decision was guised
in the abstention doctrine. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (a suit
against an Oklahoma restriction on voting based on the deprivation of personal civil
rights). Mr. Justice Frankfurter held that a plaintiff must exhaust administrative
remedies but "[t]o vindicate his present grievance the plaintiff did not have to
pursue whatever remedy may have been open to him in the state courts ...
Barring only exceptional circumstances, . . . resort to a federal court may be had
without first exhausting the judicial remedies of state courts." Id. at 274. Ac-
cord, House Committee's report on the 1957 Civil Rights Act, 1957 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News. 1975. But see the discussion of the exceptions to this historically
developed view, infra.
13. 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
14. Harkless, id., was a suit for damages and injunctive relief against a school
district and its officers in their official capacities which sought relief from the
firing of seventeen black teachers in an all-black high school.
15. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, plaintiff sought damages against the
City of Chicago and thirteen Chicago policemen who broke into his home late at
night without a search warrant, forced him and his family into the living room, and
proceeded to ransack their home and rip their mattress covers "searching" for
evidence of a two-day old murder. They took Monroe to police headquarters, held
him on open charges for many hours without allowing him a phone call, and
finally let him go without charging him of any crime-all this while a judge was
readily available to hear any charges against him.
16. Three purposes were provided by Justice Douglas for 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
(1970): 1) to override certain kinds of state laws; 2) to provide a remedy where
state law was inadequate; and 3) to provide a federal remedy where the state rem-
edy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. Supra note 15, at
173-74.
[Vol. XX754
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Court in McNeese v. Board of Education,'T noted that the Monroe case
pointed out that the "federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy
and the latter need not be sought and refused before the federal one is in-
voked."' 8  The Court went on to find that the state administrative re-
medy would have been ineffective in the case at hand, and held that ex-
haustion was not required.
A third exception to the general rule is that where there is a sub-
stantial constitutional question sufficient enough to require the convening
of a three-judge court, the state administrative remedies need not be ex-
hausted.19
There is a conflict between two United States circuits as to the cur-
rent state of the law pertaining to exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Second Circuit in Eisen v. Eastman, a case in which a landlord
brought a § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of a city rent
control law, 20 felt that the decisions similar to McNeese were too broad
and qualified them.21 The court based its decision on the premise that
there would be destructive consequences to the concepts of federalism and
that there would be a great burden to the federal courts if they were
compelled to hear all cases involving unconstitutional acts by state and
local officials.22 The Second Circuit in Eisen stated that McNeese dealt
with an administrative remedy which was not effective, 23 that other rem-
17. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
18. Id. at 671. Accord, Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967), where the
Court held that relief under the Civil Rights Act could not be denied welfare claim-
ants on the ground that they had not first sought relief under state laws which
provided inadequate administrative remedies; and Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968), where the Court held that a state prisoner has a federal cause of action for
a Civil Rights Act allegation in equity asking that the court order the governor and
state correction officials to return certain legal material and other property seized
from him without resort to futile state administrative remedies.
19. This exception arose in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), where the
Court held that the "[d]ecisions of this Court, however, establish that a plaintiff in
an action brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1343, is not required to exhaust administrative remedies, where the constitutional
challenge is sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a three-
judge court." Id. at 312 n.4. But see Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 523 (2d
Cir. 1967), where the court cited Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1967), in
holding that there must be exhaustion where the state remedy was complete and
adequate.
20. 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. "We find little basis in this for the view taken by many courts and com-
mentators, see Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies under the Civil Rights Act,
68 COLUM. L. REv. 1203 n.15, that McNeese abolished the requirement of ex-
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edies were inadequate24 or futile, 25 and therefore, exhaustion was not re-
quired. McNeese, however, the court continued, did not abolish the
general principle that plaintiff's must exhaust state administrative remedies
before being allowed a federal cause of action. 26
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, felt in Hall that the doctrine of
exhaustion of state administrative remedies was abolished: "This Court
routinely rejects the cry that it is necessary to exhaust state remedies. '27
The Hall court, however, maintained that while exhaustion was unneces-
sary, a plaintiff must pursue state administrative remedies until he receives
an "authoritative institutional decision or pronouncement. ' 28  Only after
such authoritative decision would the plaintiff be permitted a federal cause
of action. Thus it appears that a uniformity among the circuits on the
question of administrative exhaustion has yet to be accomplished. Since
Hall dealt with the issue of exhaustion of state judicial remedies, its opinion
on state administrative remedies was dictum. Nevertheless, the Hall court
refused to require exhaustion based on the facts.
The second jurisdictional issue which the Hall court encountered is
whether the doctrine of abstention is appropriate under this factual setting.
The doctrine of abstention is another device by which the federal courts
may avoid exercise of federal jurisdiction and thus avoid a controversy
over issues of constitutional law. 29 The rationale behind the doctrine is
that it is a way in which the federal courts in "exercising a wise discre-
tion" 30 refuse to use their authority because of their regard for federalism.
haustion of adequate state administrative remedies in all cases brought under the
successor to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Court held only that there
was no administrative remedy by which plaintiffs could have any assurance of get-
ting the relief they wanted . . . even if they were clearly entitled to it." Id. at 569.
24. "[it was also exceedingly unlikely that an administrative hearing would
produce a change." Id. at 569.
25. "Under such circumstances to compel resort to an administrative remedy
culminating in an appeal to that very officer 'would be to demand a futile act.'"
Id. at 569.
26. "The answer, we think, can be found in the later statement in King v. Smith,
citing Damico, that a plaintiff in an action under the Civil Rights Act 'is not re-
quired to exhaust administrative remedies, where the constitutional challenge is
sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a three-judge court.'"
Id.
27. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 436. Accord, Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F.2d
1129 (5th Cir. 1970).
28. "It may be that exhaustion of administrative remedies is still required at least
to the extent that it is necessary to have an authoritative institutional decision or
pronouncement." Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 436 n.11.
29. See Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an
Activist Era, 80 HARv. L. REv. 604 (1967).
30. Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1940).
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The federal court declines to exercise its jurisdiction, and allows the state
court to decide issues of state law.
Abstention allows a federal court whose jurisdiction has been properly invoked to
postpone decision, pending trial in a state court when the result might turn on
issues of state law. . . It denies immediate relief but retains jurisdiction, sending
the parties to the state courts to obtain a decision on the state-law issues, usually
in a declaratory judgment action. 31
Thus, if the party does not obtain satisfactory relief at the state level, he may
then seek relief in the federal courts. This often results in an extensive
delay causing much hardship, for, after litigating his federal claims in the
state court, the party must start all over again in the federal district court.
For example, in Government Employees v. Windsor,82 a ruling on the
merits was not produced after five years of litigation, while in England
v. Louisiana Medical Examiners,"3 it took nine years to achieve a ruling
on the merits. Presently, four interpretations of the abstention doctrine ale
being advanced. The first holds that where a question may be disposed of
entirely on state law, the federal courts should avoid a decision on a federal
constitutional question; the second holds that the federal courts should avoid
a needless conflict with the state when it determines its own affairs; the third
states that unsettled questions of state law are properly for the states to
decide; the fourth seeks to avoid congesting the dockets of the federal
courts.3 4 The district court in Hall had also cited Schwartz 5 for the prop-
osition that the case should be dismissed based upon the doctrine of ab-
stention. The Schwartz version of the abstention doctrine was that since the
state court had a procedure which allowed a claim to be presented, the
fact that there existed an opportunity for direct review to the Unites States
Supreme Court of all state judicial decisions protected any federal interests
involved. But the court rejected the Schwartz appraisal of the doctrine:
31. Supra note 29.
32. 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
33. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
34. For a complete analysis of the abstention doctrine, see, Kurland, Toward a
Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D. 481 (1959); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L. REV.
815 (1959); Note, Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1959); Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frank-
furter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604 (1967); Note, Conse-
quences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1358 (1960); Note,
Abstention, An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 226 (1959); 40 TEX.
L. REV. 1041 (1962); Note, Civil Rights and State Authority: Toward the Produc-
tion of a Just Equilibrium, 1966 Wisc. L. REV. 831, 857 (1966); Comment,
Federal Jurisdiction: Problems Involved in the Discretionary Use of the Abstention
Doctrine, 1961 Wisc. L. REV. 450 (1961); Note, 69 YALE L.J. 643 (1960).
35. Supra note 9.
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"This mutation is inconsistent with the prior evolution of the law. It
like the exhaustion doctrine cannot survive."'30 The rationale underlying
the court's analysis is that the state law was clear: there was no need
further to define it. The Texas statute 37 does in fact give the questioned
power to the landlord of seizing the tenant's property without any hearing
or other proceeding.38 And using article 5238a as an example of when
"the cloth of state law" is "off the loom" the court stated that where
"there can be no doubt as to what the state law provides, there is no
place for abstention.' 39
Judge Murrah's famous statement in Stapleton v. Mitchell,40 quoted
in McNeese and again in Hall, admirably lends support to this trend against
abstention:
We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal Courts sit, human rights under the
Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we have
not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights
asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum.4 1
Thus it is clear that where, as in Hall, the constitutionality of a state statute
is challenged in federal court, and that state statute is settled as to its
meaning, there should be no place for federal court abstention in the case.
The courts are required to pass on the issue of the constitutionality of the
statute.
The remaining jurisdictional question facing the court was whether
the $10,000 amount generally required for federal jurisdiction applied in
this case. This jurisdictional amount is set out in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.42
36. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 436. For arguments for and against ab-
stention, see WRIGHT, supra note 7, at § 52.
37. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5238(a) (1970).
38. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 437 n.13.
39. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 437. See also supra note 15, at 183,
where the Court held: "The fact that a state remedy is available is not a valid
basis for federal court abstention." Cf. supra note 17; Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241 (1967); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Wright v. City of Mont-
gomery, Alabama, 406 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1969); Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp.
944 (M.D. Fla. 1970). See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), where Mr.
Justice Douglas held that abstention should have been invoked by the district court
because the question of the constitutionality of the state statute in question was
uncertain and had never been interpreted by the state court. See also City of
Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959). In Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964), it was decided that "[a]bstention,
which is not automatically required, and which had been requested by neither
party was not warranted ...there being no danger that a federal decision would
disrupt state regulation." Id. at 328-29.
40. 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945).
41. Id. at 55.
42. "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
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There are many exceptions to this requirement. Quite clearly, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1343(4) 4 3 provides one exception, because it gives the federal courts
jurisdiction to redress the deprivation of civil rights-as opposed to prop-
erty rights-regardless of the amount of damages. It was used in Hall
to overcome the $10,000 amount, based on the personal civil right of being
free from unreasonable searches and seizures in one's abode. Another
example where § 1343(4) was used as a means of avoiding the $10,000
requirement is Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service,4 4 where the
court ruled that § 1343(4) allows jurisdiction for claims stated under §
1983 as it works as a "conduit through which other statutory rights are
protected . . ." and by itself protects civil rights, without a requirement of
any jurisdictional amount.45
Gomez and Hall are similar in that both use § 1343(4) to circumvent
the jurisdictional requirement of $10,000. They are also similar in that
both deal mainly with personal rights-civil rights of migratory workers in
Gomez. At first glance, one would thing that Hall was based on property
rights-the seized television set of Sylvia Garson-and indeed one of de-
fendant's arguments was that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 because only "property rights are involved and . . .
§ 1343 does not protect property rights."' 46 But the court held that
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
(b) Except when express provision therefore is otherwise made in a statute of
the United States, where the plaintiff is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less
than the sum or value of $10,000, computed without regard to any setoff or
counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive
of interests and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in
addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff."
43. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(4) (1958), reprinted supra note 3.
44. 417 F.2d 569 n.39 (5th Cir. 1969).
45. id. Accord, Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1967), where that
court held: "No jurisdictional amount is necessary if a complaint states a cause
of action for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983." Id. at 769.
46. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 438. Defendant based her argument on
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), where Mr. Justice Stone, in stating his "per-
sonal right" theory, held that "[t]he conclusion seems inescapable that the right
conferred by the Act of 1871 to maintain a suit in equity in the federal courts to
protect the suitor against a deprivation of rights or immunities secured by the
Constitution, has been preserved, and that whenever the right or immunity is one
of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringement of prop-
erty rights, there is jurisdiction .... ." Id. at 531-32.
See also Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); Holt v. Indiana Manu-
facturing Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900); Abernathy v. Carpenter, 208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D.
Mo. 1962). But see Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1967); McGuire v.
Sadler, 337 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1964); Bussie v. Long, supra note 45; Atlanta
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those cases cited by defendant based on property rights were not ap-
plicable to Hall because Hall dealt with personal rights and not property
rights, even though the object of the controversy was a television set.
Defendant's property right theory was rejected because the invasion of
the tenant's home, a violation of his rights, far outweighed the seizure of
the television set.47 Appropriately, as the court had determined in Gomez,
"[w]e need not determine the extent to which 'property' rights are outside
of § 1983 recourse since the essence of the claim here is the denial of
rights of an essentially personal nature [civil rights of migratory work-
ers]."' 48  Thus, the jurisdictional requirement of $10,000 did not have to
be met in Hall.
PRIVATE CITIZENS AND § 198349
A question arises as to whether a private citizen can be said to act
"under color" of state authority. This question arises because, previously,
decisions were rendered allowing a federal cause of action which con-
cerned only acts of the state itself, acts of state officials-whether acting
pursuant to or in derogation of a state statute-or private citizens acting
in concert with state officials. The Hall court decided that a federal cause
of action will lie for acts by a private citizen, who, acting alone, deprived a
party of his constitutional rights while acting under color of a state statute.
Defendant in Hall argued that the requisite state action needed to
allow a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 was not pres-
ent because the property taken was seized by a landlady and not a
state official. The court held that the defendants were correct in their
claim that the requisite state action must be met for a suit under § 1983:
For a deprivation of rights secured by the fourteenth amendment to ensue,
a state action must occur.50 What constitutes "state action" has been
Bowling Center, Inc. v. Allen, 389 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1968); Burt v. City of New
York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946); Note, The "Property Rights" Exception to
Civil Rights Jurisdiction-Confusion Compounded, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1208 (1968).
47. "[b]ut the rights that the petition seeks to protect are not the rights to the
television. They are, instead, the right of the individual to be secure in his home
and free from the invasion of that home without any prior procedure to protect his
interest. They are then the most personal constitutional liberties of privacy and
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by private persons with
the blessings of this state. . . . These rights that this petition seeks to protect are
truly the fundamentals of liberty, the essence of human dignity. Such fundamental,
human, highly personalized rights are 'just the stuff from which § 1983 claims are
to be made.'" Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 438.
48. Supra note 44 at 579.
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1964), reprinted supra note 4.
50. See generally Horan, Law and Social Change; The Dynamics of the 'State
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interpreted in an increasingly liberal vein in the last several years. Hall
held that the acts of a private citizen can become the actions of the state
for purposes of § 1983 and for the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 51
Two cases were cited by the court to support this decision. The first
case, Baldwin v. Morgan,52 found a plaintiff suing a railroad for its
maintenance of separate waiting rooms for whites and blacks. A state
order had demanded that the railroad provide such waiting rooms. The
court held:
[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or
functions governmental in nature they become instruments of the State and subject
to the same constitutional limitations as the State itself.53
But here, since the state had commanded, via order, the doing of the act
in question, there was really not an independent action by a private citizen.
The second case, Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co.,54 was an action by a white
woman against an owner of a restaurant who failed to serve her because
she was in the company of blacks. The United States Supreme Court
held that a federal cause of action could lie under § 1983 against a
private citizen and not the state or one of its officials; but that in order
for such an action to lie, plaintiff would have to prove that the employee
of the restaurant, in the course of his employment, had reached an
agreement with the city policeman--a state official-to deny plaintiff serv-
ice in the restaurant or subsequently to cause her arrest because she was a
white person in the company of blacks. Here, again, there was the con-
notation of acting in concert with a "state" official in order for a federal
Action' Doctrine, 17 J. PUB. L. 258 (1968). See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1947); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1880); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Brinkerhoff Faris Trust
& Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881);
Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894); Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Carter v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Raymond v.
Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907); Home Telephone and Telegraph
Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259
U.S. 530 (1922); American Railway Express Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U.S. 269
(1927); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32 (1940).
51. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 439. See also Gomez v. Florida State
Employment Commission, supra note 44, at 578.
52. 287 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961). In this case, the Court held that the act of
maintaining separate waiting room facilities based on skin color "when done by the
[Railroad] Terminal as commanded by state orders is action by the state." Id. at
755-56.
53. Id. at 755, n.9.
54. Supra note 5.
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cause of action to lie.5 5  A similar case was United States v. Price,56
a criminal case prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.A. § 242, the criminal counter-
part to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Criminal and civil cases involving action
under color of state law should be viewed together, as a decision in one
area is necessarily binding on the other area. 57 There, the court held
that a private citizen acting together with a state official constitutes the
requisite state action needed under § 1983.58
The Hall decision went much further than Baldwin, Adickes, and
Price in its holding that a private citizen acting alone can be acting with
the requisite state action necessary to constitute a cause of action under
§ 1983.
[Tlhe action taken, the entry into another's home and the seizure of another's
property, was an act that possesses many, if not all, of the characteristics of an
act of the State .... Thus, Article 5238a vests in the landlord and his agents
authority that is normally exercised by the state and historically has been a state
function. 59
Thus the cases of Baldwin, Adickes, and Price really are not precedents
for the Hall decision as they all involve a private citizen acting in concert
with a state official.
To further support its view, however, the Hall court considered past
cases. In the last thirty years, state action questions centered on
whether the alleged wrongdoer "was dressed with state authority." 60  The
predecessor of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983-Rev. Stats. § 1979-was interpreted
so that only action authorized under state law came under the statute.61
The case of United States v. Classic,62 changed this interpretation. In
Classic, it was alleged that defendants altered and falsely counted ballots
in a Louisiana primary. The decision was that "[m]isuse of power, pos-
sessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrong-
55. Id. See also Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 50, where state judicial action
affirmatively enforcing a private scheme of discrimination against blacks was held
unconstitutional.
56. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
57. Turkington, supra note 5.
58. "To act under color of law does not require that the accused be an officer
of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the
state." Supra note 56, at 789. See also infra, note 91.
59. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 439.
60. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 439.
61. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
62. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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doer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color'
of state law."68
This view that misuse of state law by one acting under color of
state law allows a federal cause of action was upheld in Douglas v. City
of Jeannette,64 where members of Jehovah's Witnesses brought a class ac-
tion in a federal district court to restrain a city and its mayor from enforc-
ing against them an ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of orders of
merchandise without first procuring a license from the city authorities
and without paying a license tax. The Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
missal by the court of appeals and held that a cause of action arises under
the Civil Rights Act whenever the right of free speech is violated under
color of a state statute or ordinance. 65
A qualification of the color of law clause occurred in Snowdon v.
Hughes,"6 where the court found that plaintiff failed to state a cause of ac-
tion under Rev. Stat. § 1979-predecessor to § 1983-when he alleged
that defendants did not certify him as a nominee for state representative,
as required by state law and under the fourteenth amendment.
The protection extended to citizens of the United States by the privileges and
immunities clause includes those rights and privileges which, under the laws
and Constitution of the United States, are incident to citizenship of the United
States, but does not include rights pertaining to state citizenship and derived solely
from the relationship of the citizen and his state established by state law.6 7
These cases illustrate the interpretation of state action as it applies to §
1983 and its counterparts. If a person receives power and authority to
act from a state law, his subsequent act is state action, even if in the
performance of that act he misuses such authority.
A major step in extending the color of law interpretation was taken in
the famous case of Screws v. United States.68 In Screws, a criminal action
under U.S.C.A. § 242,69 the Sheriff of Baker County, Georgia, arrested
Hall, a black, on a charge of theft of a tire. Hall was handcuffed
and then beaten to death by the sheriff and two other state officials. The
63. Id. at 326.
64. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
65. Id.
66. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
67. Id. at 6-7. Accord, Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919); Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83
(1940); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277
(1937). See also Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900), where the
Court held that an unlawful denial, by state action, of a right to state political of-
fice is not a denial of a right of property or of liberty secured by the due process
clause.
68. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
69. 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (1964), reprinted supra note 5.
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indictment charged that petitioners, acting under color of the laws of
Georgia, willfully deprived Hall of his rights under the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court held:
We are of the view that petitioners acted under color of law in making the arrest
of Robert Hall and in assaulting him. They were officers of the law who made the
arrest. By their own admissions they assaulted Hall in order to protect themselves
and to keep their prisoner from escaping. It was their duty under Georgia law to
make the arrest effective. Hence their conduct comes within the statute.70
Thus, Screws extended the "under color" statutes to cases involving is-
sues-police brutality here--other than those having racial and political
overtones. 1
In Monroe v. Pape,72 police officers illegally broke into plaintiff's
home, ransacked it, arrested plaintiff, and detained him on an "open"
charge for ten hours. The Supreme Court held that § 1983 provided
plaintiff with a civil action against such police officers in lieu of the
Classic and Screws (both criminal cases) expansions of state action.
"We conclude that the meaning given 'under color of' law in the Classic
case and in the Screws and Williams cases was the correct one; and we
adhere to it." 3 In a dissenting opinion, however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
rejected this expanded definition, and maintained that state action-es-
pecially as applied to civil remedy sections such as § 1983-meant only
action taken pursuant to and in accordance with state law.7 4
70. Supra note 68, at 108.
71. Accord, Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), where a special
police officer was convicted, based on Screws v. United States, supra note 68, under
the same criminal statute for using brutality to extract a confession of theft. See
also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), where federal jurisdiction was upheld in a
civil damage action against F.B.I. agents, based on the fourth and fifth amendments.
See Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), where the
court used Screws as a basis for holding that Congress gave a right to a federal
cause of action ". . . to every individual whose federal rights were trespassed upon
by any officer acting under pretense of state law." Id. at 249. They also stated
that Congress intended to abrogate the absolute privilege of judicial officers and
governors of the various states. Id. But for a limitation on this abrogation, see
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), and Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124
(5th Cir. 1955). Several other cases have followed Screws to use ordinary police
brutality without racial overtones: Refoule v. Ellis, 74 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga.
1947); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3rd Cir. 1949); Geach v. Moynahan,
207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953); Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957);
Davis v. Turner, 197 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1952); McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d
1016 (6th Cir. 1949); State ex rel. Temple v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 102 F.
Supp. 444 (W.D. Ark. 1952); Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948);
Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958); Deloach v. Rogers, 268 F.2d 928
(5th Cir. 1959); McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
72. Supra note 15.
73. Supra note 15, at 187.
74. Supra note 15.
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In Gannon v. Action,75 defendants, members of various black militant
organizations, entered a church and disrupted the ongoing services. Plain-
tiff, pastor of the church, brought an action under § 1983 seeking to
enjoin defendants from future disruptions. The courts granted the in-
junction, holding that defendants had acted under color of a state
"custom. ' 76 The court reasoned that a Missouri "custom" allows persons
to worship at the church of their choice. Defendants, the court continued,
entered the church under the color of this custom. After so entering,
defendants deprived plaintiff and other churchgoers of their constitutional
rights of freedom of assembly, speech, and worship. Since defendants
had entered under color of a state custom and subsequently violated the
civil rights of others, the court concluded, they were subject to civil
liability under § 1983. Thus, the Gannon court expanded the scope of
§ 1983 to include actions against those acting under color of state custom
as well as state law.
Plaintiffs in Hall based their claim on the case of Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.,77 where a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute al-
lowed wages to be frozen before a trial and without any opportunity on
the part of the wage-earner to be heard or to tender any defense he might
have. Plaintiff in Sniadach moved to dismiss the garnishment proceedings
for failure to satisfy due process requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme
Court and held this statute unconstitutional. There, it was stated that
"[w]here the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended
argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing. . . this pre-
judgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due
process."78 However, this statement was qualified: Not all summary pro-
cedure will violate due process and "may well meet the requirements of due
process in extraordinary situations. 79
In comparing Sniadach with Hall, the court found the two cases similar.
The functional role of the creditor's attorney and debtor's employer in Sniadach,
even when coupled with the formal roles of the clerk who issued the writ, is not
75. 303 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
76. Id. at 1245. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1964). But see supra note 54
and 23 VAND. L. REv. 413 (1970), which criticize the Gannon opinion.
77. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
78. Id. at 340. He also stated that "[tlhe interim freezing of wages without a
chance to be heard violated procedural due process." Id.
79. id. at 341. Cf., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947); Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94
(1920); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
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significantly different from the role of the landlady here. And here [in Hall] the
state action requirement is also met.8 0
But query, were they not significantly different because, in Hall, there was
a federal cause of action against a private citizen acting independently of
any state official or command whereas in Sniadach the person acting was
the creditor's attorney-an officer of the court and thus a state official who
was acting in a formal role according to a writ issued by the court itself?
Though recognizing the similarity of the Sniadach case, the court
in Hall was reluctant to pass judgment on the merits of plaintiff's claim."'
The court provided, however, adequate guidelines for the lower court to
consider on remand in determining the constitutionality of article 5238a,
and therefore to resolve plaintiff's claim definitively. The court suggested
the balancing of due process requirements with "the competing interest of
society served by quick and decisive action."'8 2 The court likened article
5238a to the prehearing summary procedure in the Wisconsin garnishment
statute in Sniadach,s8 hinting that unless other facts are produced, article
5238a should be declared unconstitutional. But the court did warn that
article 5238a is not a garnishment statute, and that not "all prehearing
summary procedures are . . . unconstitutional. 's 4 Also, the court held,
as did the Sniadach court, that the prehearing seizure of property is per-
missible in extraordinary situations.85
In further examining the balancing of interests analysis suggested in
Hall, with particular emphasis directed to the constitutionality of the sum-
mary prehearing procedure as detailed in Sniadach, the case of Goldberg
v. Kelly,8 6 serves to provide firm support. That case held that only a hear-
ing which allowed the person affected by the act to present his case would
80. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 440.
81. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 440. The court based its decision not to
pass on the merits of Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111
(1962), where the Court held that adjudication of such delicate problems which are
sure to have far-reaching import should rest on a full and complete record.
82. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12. See also Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807
(2d cir. 1967), where the court held: "[t]o determine in any given case what
procedures due process requires, the Court must carefully determine and balance the
nature of the private interest involved, taking account of history and the precise
circumstances surrounding the case at hand." Id. at 811.
83. W.S.A. § 267.18(2)(a) (1957).
84. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 440.
85. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12. The court based this decision on Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra note 79, where the Court, in an opinion de-
livered by Mr. Justice Douglas, held that a provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act permitting multiple seizures of misbranded articles when the ad-
ministrator has probable cause to believe, from facts found, without hearing, that a
misbranded article may lead to injury or damage of the purchaser is not unconstitu-
tional. See also Fahey v. Mallonee, supra note 79.
86. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Evidenti-
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avoid depriving that person of his constitutional rights. The commissioner
of social services of the city of New York sought to terminate the benefits
of welfare recipients before any type of pre-termination hearing was held,
arguing that the combination of a post-termination "fair hearing" and in-
formal pre-termination review was sufficient. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the district court's decision that only a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing would satisfy the procedural due process requirement.8 7 This de-
cision was based on the obvious delay which would cause the already bur-
dened welfare recipient much economic hardship before his case could be
heard. The court in Hall gave another hint as to how the lower court
should rule:
Art. 5238a seems only to protect the landlord's interest, and not any broader public
interest. Moreover, there is no requirement in Art. 5238a that there be any
showing of the likelihood or the threat of the debtor-tenant's absconding, leaving
the creditor-landlord with no effective way to collect a just debt. In addition, the
same kind of deep personal hardship can result from the seizure of personal and
household goods as resulted from the garnishment of wages under the Wisconsin
statute in Sniadach.88
However, the court felt that if a "compelling interest" is served by article
5238a, or its peremptory seizure procedure-as brought out in the lower
court-there may be a just reason for upholding its constitutionality.8 9
In conclusion, Hall v. Garson is significant because it widens the
scope of § 1983 to include actions against private citizens acting alone.
Of course, such actions must still be authorized by a state law. This
decision has been buttressed by United States v. Guest.90 In Guest, a
Georgia grand jury indicted six private persons for criminal conspiracy in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 241.91 The indictment charged that the defend-
ants had conspired to deprive blacks of their fourteenth amendment right
of equal protection. After stressing the fact that the equal protection
clause only protected persons from action by the state, or by those acting
for the state, the Court stated:
This is not to say, however, that the involvement of the State need be either exclu-
sive or direct. In a variety of situations the Court has found state action of a
ary Hearing Required Prior to Termination of Welfare Benefits, 19 DEPAUL L.
REv. 552 (1970).
87. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra note 86.
88. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12. For cases applying Sniadach to different
types of garnishment statutes, and other prehearing summary devices, see, e.g.,
Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45 (1969). See also Larson v.
Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969); Sackin v. Kersting, 10 Ariz.
App. 340, 458 P.2d 544 (1969).
89. Hall v. Garson, supra note 12, at 441.
90. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
91. Id. at 747.
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nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause even though
the participation of the State was peripheral, or its action was only one of several
co-operative forces leading to the Constitutional violation. 92
Thus, the Guest majority opinion admitted that state action occurs even
when the participation of the state is "peripheral." Moreover, Mr.
Justice Clark,93 concurring (joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Fortas), and Mr. Justice Brennan,94 concurring and dissenting in part
(joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas), both indicated
that Congress has the power to pass legislation which prohibits and
punishes all action that interferes with fourteenth amendment rights-
regardless of whether that action is state action; a majority of the Court
supported this view. Thus, while the Hall court expanded § 1983 so
that it provides a remedy for those deprived of their rights by a private
person acting with state authorization, the Guest court is willing to con-
stitutionally accept a statute which prohibits any-even totally private-
interference with the civil rights of others.
The ramifications of the Hall decision are innumerable. For example,
an owner of a restaurant licensed by the state refuses to serve persons
with long hair. Is this state action within the ambit of the Hall decision?
Or an owner of a surburban housing subdivision refuses to sell to a
foreigner because a state law gives a right to discriminate in the sale
of real estate. Is the owner dressed with state authority according to
the Hall decision? Or a state law allows a landlord to enter a tenant's
apartment to inspect for damages without the tenant's permission. Is
the landlord within the Hall determination of state authority? Or a city
ordinance permits a citizen's arrest for violation of curfew. Is this state
action according to the Hall doctrine of state authority? Or a state law
allows private clubs to restrict membership based on race, creed, or color.
Is this the kind of state action contemplated by the Hall court? Or a
state law permits the incorporation of a group which terrorizes minority
groups (e.g. the Ku Klux Klan). Is that group dressed with state action
as per the Hall ruling?
Even though the plaintiff's remedies in the area of § 1983 have ex-
panded, it still takes a very long time for the American judicial system to
grind out that remedy. Sniadach and Hall are good examples of this prob-
lem. In Sniadach, the plaintiff waited three years for a remedy. In Hall,
the plaintiff is still waiting for an answer to the invasion of her abode and
the taking of her property therefrom.
Robert Walner
92. Id. at 755-56.
93. Id. at 762.
94. Id. at 782.
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